

# Determinants of PTA Design: Insights from Machine Learning\*

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## Abstract

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have emerged as the dominant form of international trade governance. Provisions included in PTAs are increasingly numerous, broad in their purview, deep in their scope, and varied between agreements. We study the economic, political, and geographic determinants of PTA design differences. For each of the hundreds of classified PTA provisions, we consider hundreds of country-pair characteristics as potential determinants, covering many individual mechanisms the literature has studied. We employ random forests, a supervised machine learning technique, to handle this high dimensionality and complexity. We use a robust variable importance measure to identify the most critical determinants of the inclusion of each PTA provision. Contagion due to competition for export markets, geographic proximity, and governance quality emerge as essential determinants of PTA design. These results motivate future exploration of individual mechanisms our exercise points to.

**Keywords:** Preferential trade agreements, machine learning, provisions, trade integration

**JEL Codes:** F13; F14; F15

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# 1 Introduction

Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) increasingly dominate international trade governance. Multilateral negotiations through the World Trade Organization have given way to bilateral or regional PTA negotiations, whose number has grown from less than 50 in the early 1990s to over 360 in 2023 (WTO 2023). This explosion has occurred despite tariffs being at their lowest-ever levels between most countries. Indeed, modern PTAs are no longer dealing mainly with reducing tariffs. Instead, they are increasingly broad in the number of non-tariff policy areas their provisions cover, such as intellectual property rights protection, environmental laws, or public procurement rules. They are also increasingly deep in how far they go in harmonizing the rules of international trade. Those agreements vary widely in the provisions they include, reflecting different quantitative levels and qualitative features of trade liberalization and regulatory integration that signatories commit to. Given the growing role of PTAs, making sense of their increasing complexity and diversity is crucial for understanding modern trade institutions. However, isolating the determinants of PTA differences is challenging because PTA design is complex, and its determinants could have unexpected non-linear and interacting effects. This paper uses random forests, a supervised machine learning technique, to handle this complexity and identify the essential economic, geographic, cultural, and political determinants of differences in Preferential Trade Agreement design. This exercise motivates and informs future research that would delve deeper into individual mechanisms related to determinants identified by random forests.

Studying the determinants of PTA design requires its systematization. Two existing datasets provide an expansive classification of provisions included in preferential trade agreements: Design of Trade Agreements (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014) and Deep Trade Agreements (Mattoo, Rocha, and Ruta 2020). These two teams developed classifications of PTA provisions and manually encoded whether each classified provision is included in a given PTA or not. We use these classified provisions as measures of PTA design differences. For each classified PTA provision, we construct a statistical model that predicts whether the provision is included in a given PTA based on the characteristics of the pair of countries that signed the agreement. Whether a pair of countries choose to add a particular provision to their PTA can be dictated by a broad range of

factors: their domestic economic and political situations, existing trade relationships, shared cultural or institutional features, and many others. We assemble hundreds of such factors observed at country- and country-pair-level, collected from dozens of data sources. The list of factors we consider is informed by the existing literature on the determinants of PTA formation as well as the nascent literature on PTA design differences. Once the statistical model is constructed, we identify the factors that contribute the most to the model's predictive capacity and are thus the most critical determinants of PTA design.

We employ random forests both for the estimation of each statistical model and for the identification of important determinants of each provision. The random forest algorithm, developed by Breiman (2001), is an effective machine learning tool for prediction.<sup>1</sup> A random forest is constructed by “growing” many individual decision trees and aggregating their predictions. This algorithm is gaining popularity in economics due to its excellent predictive performance in a wide variety of problems, many of which the classic Ordinary Least Squares regression struggles with (Varian 2014; Mullainathan and Spiess 2017). Random forests have several advantages that make them well-suited for identifying the important determinants of PTA provisions among hundreds of potential factors. First, the algorithm deals well with high-dimensional data in which the number of predictors (potential determinants) is large without running into underdeterminacy. Second, random forests naturally adapt to non-linearities and interactions between predictors in the data without requiring the econometrician to impose a flexible parametric structure ex-ante, which would be infeasible with our high-dimensional data. Third, extensions of random forests allow for missing values without invalidating the variable importance measures: a crucial advantage given the many datasets with disparate coverage that we source the potential determinant variables from (Tang and Ishwaran 2017). Finally, random forests have well-developed procedures for variable selection, facilitating our task of identifying the important determinants of PTA provisions among a multitude of potential factors: we employ the permutation importance method developed by Altmann et al. (2010).

In the initial exercise, we estimate a random forest to predict whether a PTA exists between a

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<sup>1</sup> See Biau and Scornet (2016), Schonlau and Zou (2020), or Ziegler and König (2014) for excellent reviews.

given pair of countries in a given period, which is a question the literature has extensively studied using conventional econometric techniques (Baier and Bergstrand 2004; Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch 2016). The random forest identifies geographic proximity, average regulatory quality, trade volume, and domestic political regimes as the most critical determinants of whether countries form a PTA. In the main exercise, we then estimate random forests to predict the inclusion of each classified PTA provision into an agreement between a particular country pair and aggregate the results. Firstly, we identify the country-pair characteristics that are the critical determinants of the largest number of provisions, making them influence the overall PTA design the most. Several measures of geographic proximity are highly predictive of differences in PTA design, suggesting that neighbors are interested in different dimensions of trade integration compared to remote partners. Contagion of provisions between agreements driven by competition for export markets emerges as another consistent driver of PTA design. This finding extends the existing results showing the importance of contagion for PTA formation (Baldwin 1993; Baldwin and Jaimovich 2012; Chen and Joshi 2010). Secondly, we repeat this analysis at a more fine-grained level, summarizing the critical determinants of common policy areas like intellectual property protection or anti-dumping regulation. Metrics of government quality and political competitiveness are highly relevant for several of these areas. Throughout this analysis, we link our results to individual mechanisms studied by the literature.

An extensive literature has explored the economic and political determinants of PTA formation, identifying factors that make it more likely for a pair of countries to have signed an agreement. Conceptualizing PTAs as a dichotomous variable—does an agreement between the two countries exist or not—loses the complexity of their design but makes the analysis feasible. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) show that simple geographic (like distance) and economic (like GDP level and similarity) factors related to the potential welfare benefits of trade liberalization can explain most existing PTAs. A significant strand of the literature highlights the importance of domestic interest groups, primarily exporters, supporting a PTA: Baldwin (1993) suggests that a newly signed PTA between two foreign countries hurts the competitiveness of domestic exporters, who push their government to sign a PTA of their own. Such interdependence, or contagion, in PTA formation is relevant empirically (Egger and Larch 2008; Baldwin and Jaimovich 2012; Baccini and

Dür 2012; Chen and Joshi 2010). Multi-national corporations may be no less critical in lobbying for PTAs: MNCs in developed nations seek to open new markets for investment, while developing countries, in turn, seek to attract this investment (Baccini, Dür, and Elsig 2018; Manger 2009; Bütthe and Milner 2008; Gamso and Grosse 2021). Domestic politics also seem to play a significant role: countries with autocracies or a large number of veto players sign fewer PTAs (Mansfield and Milner 2012), while leaders in developing countries may use PTAs as a way to commit to reform in a competitive political environment (Baccini and Urpelainen 2014). While most studies in this literature hypothesize a particular mechanism of PTA formation and then test it empirically, some combine a range of potential determinants informed by the literature in their empirical model to achieve the best performance in predicting PTA formation or its timing (Baier and Bergstrand 2004; Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch 2016). Our paper makes several contributions to this second strand of the literature. First, it considers a broader selection of potential economic, political, geographic, and cultural determinants of PTA formation, leveraging the ability of random forests to consider a large number of predictors and their interactions. Second, it explicitly conducts variable selection to identify which potential factors are the most critical determinants of PTA formation, leveraging variable importance measures developed for random forests. Our most novel contribution, however, is not to the question of PTA formation but to PTA design.

Recently, the literature has shifted from exploring whether a PTA exists between a pair of countries to understanding why PTAs differ in their design. Existing studies primarily follow two approaches to dealing with PTA design complexity. Some reduce this complexity to a single index of PTA breadth or depth (like the number of provisions included) and analyze the determinants of variation in this measure across agreements (Gamso and Grosse 2021; Mattoo, Rocha, and Ruta 2020; Orefice and Rocha 2014; Hofmann, Osnago, and Ruta 2019). Others deal with the complexity by focusing on a single policy area, like rules of origin, escape clauses, or labor protection, and exploring a particular mechanism determining whether a provision covering that area is included in the PTA (Raess, Dür, and Sari 2018; Kucik 2012; Lechner 2016). We contribute to this literature by analyzing PTA design while keeping its complexity largely intact: we identify the critical determinants of hundreds of individual PTA provisions and use them to suggest the most relevant mechanisms affecting the entirety of PTA design. Our broad exercise is designed not to delve deep

into a particular mechanism but to identify several areas of important determinants, informing future research into individual mechanisms. Understanding the differences in the contents of PTAs can help identify the breadth of objectives that negotiating parties are seeking and diagnose the obstacles to deeper international integration.

Our contributions to the two strands of the literature discussed above are made possible by employing advanced machine-learning methods. PTA design is high-dimensional, the number of potential determinants is significant, and these determinants tend to have non-linear and interacting effects. Classical econometric techniques tend to struggle with these features, while machine learning tends to excel in comparison (Varian 2014; Mullainathan and Spiess 2017), making it potentially effective in studying PTAs. This approach is leveraged by Breinlich et al. (2021) and Kim and Steinbach (2023), who apply machine learning techniques (lasso and several extensions) to identify PTA provisions that are most important for increasing trade flows. Our paper instead uses another machine learning technique (random forests coupled with several extensions) to understand the causes, not consequences, of PTA design differences. Machine learning methods applied to high-dimensional and non-linear economic problems can identify promising directions for future theoretical and econometric research to focus on.

## 2 Background

Multilateral trade negotiations through the World Trade Organization have largely stalled. The Doha Round of negotiations launched in 2001, but the member countries have not yet reached an agreement. Instead, treaties with restrictive membership have proliferated to fill the void. A Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) is an international treaty with restrictive membership that seeks to improve the mutual market access of its members (Limão 2016). As Figure 1a shows, the fraction of global trade between country pairs sharing a trade agreement grew steadily from 12% in the early 1960s to over 50% in 2023.<sup>2</sup> Figure 1b highlights the drastic upward jump in the number

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<sup>2</sup> Appendix Figure A.1 displays the fraction of country-pairs sharing an agreement, unweighted by their trade: it was growing steadily between the 1950s and 1970s but has skyrocketed starting in the 1990s from less than 5% in 1990 to 18% in 2017.


of new PTAs signed each year (as counted in DESTA), from below 10 in most years between 1950 and 1990 to 20-30 in most years in the 1990s. The formation of new agreements has slowed since then but is still elevated.

Not only are preferential trade agreements becoming more widespread, but they are also changing. Figure 1c shows the drastic change in the average number of provisions (as classified in DESTA) included in the agreement. Until the 1990s, most PTAs had no more than 10-20 provisions. Since the 1990s, however, that number has skyrocketed to over 100. No longer are trade agreements dealing primarily with negotiating trade cost reductions. Instead, they are increasingly concerned with harmonizing a far broader set of international trade rules and domestic regulation relevant to trade: intellectual property rights protection, government procurement rules, environmental regulation, and many other policy areas (Mattoo, Rocha, and Ruta 2020). Due to their increasing complexity, agreements are also becoming more varied in their design. As Figure 1d shows, the variance in the set of provisions included in PTAs skyrocketed in the 1990s. Figures 1b and 1d also indicate that the complexity of new agreements has hit a snag in the last couple of years. It is too early to say if that is a temporary dip or another regime change. Therefore, our paper focuses on the trend of growing complexity that lasted from the 1990s to at least the 2010s.<sup>3</sup>

The estimated impact effects of PTAs on trade far exceed what can be expected from the moderate trade cost reductions they include, suggesting that the non-tariff provisions account for much of the trade-boosting effect of PTAs (Limão 2016). Furthermore, the growing breadth of PTA provisions reflects the scope of their impact. PTAs have been found not only to boost trade but also foreign direct investment (Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr 2008), survival of democratic regimes (Liu and Ornelas 2014), and even human rights protection (Hafner-Burton 2013)—as long as relevant provisions are part of the agreement. Understanding the determinants of provision inclusion can help understand the breadth of outcomes that signatories are seeking—and why they may seek some outcomes and not others. Understanding the determinants of this increased complexity and diversity of PTA design matters also for understanding its effects. Estimating the impact of PTA formation or design differences on trade or other outcomes suffers from the endogeneity

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<sup>3</sup> The patterns of PTA evolution discussed in this section using the DESTA dataset are robust to using the DTA dataset: see Appendix Figures A.2, A.3, and A.4, the DTA analogs of Figures 1b, 1c, and 1d respectively.



**Figure 1:** Evolution of PTAs

*Note.* Panel (a) displays the share of all bilateral international trade that occurred between pairs of countries sharing a PTA (as classified in EIA), by year. Panels (b)-(d) are based on PTAs and provisions as classified in DESTA. Panel (b) displays the number of new PTAs signed per year. Panel (c) displays the average number of provisions in newly signed PTAs, by year. Panel (d) displays the change in the variance of provisions included in newly signed PTAs. Variance is measured as the trace of the covariance matrix of vectors indicating the inclusion of provisions in each PTA, which is equivalent to the sum of variances of the binary provision inclusion variable across provisions.



of countries' decisions to form those PTAs. A strand of the literature tackles this problem by instrumenting for PTA formation with its important determinants that are plausibly exogenous to the outcome variable being studied (Magee 2003; Egger et al. 2011). Identifying a wide range of essential determinants not only of PTA formation but also design can thus aid future work in this line by providing potential instruments to choose from.


### 3 Empirical Methods

#### 3.1 Random Forests

*Classification Trees and Random Forests*—The random forest is a supervised machine learning algorithm introduced by Breiman (2001). Analogously to a regression, the algorithm constructs a statistical model that predicts the value of an outcome variable based on the values of provided predictor variables. In our application, the prediction task is binary classification: the forest must predict whether a given country-pair has a particular PTA provision. A random forest is an ensemble model comprised of many smaller models, namely classification trees. Each tree is trained on a random bootstrap sample of the data, where the sample is drawn with replacement, and its size equals the size of the original data. To come up with a single prediction of the outcome variable for a given observation, the random forest collects the predictions of all individual trees and picks the majority prediction. Each classification tree in a random forest consists of nodes that repeatedly partition the data into branches. Each node splits the data into two groups based on the value of a particular predictor variable. The predictor variable and value to split on are picked to optimize some goodness-of-fit measure, i.e., to achieve the highest contrast between the two branches in the expected value of the outcome variable. Not all predictor variables are considered in the search, however: at each node, only a random subset  $M_{try}$  of predictor variables is picked for the search. Then, all possible cutoff values (for continuous variables) or all partitions of groups into two sets (for categorical variables) are searched over to find the best split.

Figure 2 provides a stylized illustration. At the first node, the algorithm chooses to split on the value of continuous variable  $X_3$  at cutoff  $a$ , sending observations with  $X_3 \leq a$  to the left branch and those with  $X_3 > a$  to the right one. Once the data is split into two branches, the process repeats at

the two newly created nodes. The left branch is split again on the categorical variable  $X_1$ , and the right branch on the binary variable  $X_7$ . With each consecutive split, the number of observations going down each branch to the following node drops. Once the number of observations at a node falls to some cutoff value *nodesize*, the branching stops: the majority value of the binary outcome variable of observations at this terminal node provides the prediction of the branch.<sup>4</sup> To obtain the tree's prediction of the outcome value of a new observation, the observation is "dropped" down the tree, following the branches according to its predictor values. Then, the observation arrives at one of the terminal nodes, generating the prediction. There are two sources of randomness in a random forest: the random bootstrap sample used by each individual tree and the random selection of predictors to consider for the role of the splitting variable at each node. These two features mitigate the propensity of individual trees to overfit and allow random forests to achieve high out-of-sample predictive performance compared to other machine learning methods (Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil 2006).



**Figure 2:** Illustration of a Classification Tree

*Note.* The figure provides an example of a simple classification tree with two levels of splits. Based on the observable characteristics  $\{X_i\}_i$ , the tree predicts whether the outcome variable is 0 or 1 for each observation. Only three characteristics are used as predictors:  $X_1$ ,  $X_3$ , and  $X_7$ .

*Random Forests are Well-Suited for Studying the Determinants of PTA Formation and Design*—Random forests have several advantages that make them a better choice for identifying the essential determinants of PTA design than ordinary least squares (OLS) regression or alternative machine

<sup>4</sup> If the outcome variable is continuous, the tree is called a regression tree, and the average of values in the final node provides the prediction.

learning methods (Ziegler and König 2014; Schonlau and Zou 2020). Firstly, the random forest algorithm deals well with high-dimensional data in which the number of predictors is comparable to or even higher than the number of observations. While OLS cannot handle this situation, random forests circumvent underdeterminacy by considering only a sub-sample of predictors as candidates for splitting at each node. This approach is helpful for our exercise since it allows us to consider hundreds of potential determinants. Secondly, random forests naturally adapt to non-linearities and interactions between predictors in the data without requiring the econometrician to impose the parametric structure ex-ante. This feature is critical as we consider many potential determinants without hypothesizing any particular relationships beforehand. Allowing for a broad array of possible interactions and non-linearities in OLS would balloon the number of predictors and make estimation impossible. Random forests adapt to interactions and non-linearities they find on the fly through the flexible structure of repeated node splits.

Thirdly, one extension of random forests, described below, allows for the presence of missing values without relying on imputation that may have spurious effects on variable importance measures. This feature is essential for our exercise that combines hundreds of potential determinants from many data sources: few country-pair-year observations have no missing values in any of these. OLS would require restricting the sample to this small subset of observations or restricting the set of predictors only to those with universal coverage. The method of handling missing values in random forests allows us to avoid these extremes and maximize the information utilized in estimation. Finally, random forests have well-developed procedures for variable selection, facilitating our task of identifying the critical determinants of PTA provisions among many potential factors discussed in Section 3.2. An extensive literature on variable selection measures for random forests distinguishes them from many alternative machine learning techniques.

*Dealing with Missing Observations*—Collecting hundreds of variables to serve as potential determinants from many different sources inevitably runs into the problem of disparate data coverage. Various data sources cover different country-year combinations, and the gaps in their data availability do not overlap perfectly. With each added variable, the share of country-pair-year observations with missing values in at least some potential determinants inexorably grows. There are two standard solutions to the problem of missing values (Scheffer 2002). The first is to throw out

the missing data, which means using rows (country-pair-year observations) with no missing values in any of the columns (potential determinants) or only using columns with no missing values in any of the rows. Both would throw out most of the determinants we observe, leaving only a small subset of the data suffering from severe selection. This method is unsuitable for our application because considering many potential determinants is one of the critical objectives. The second solution is to impute the missing data. This approach does not discard any information, but it complicates the interpretation of variable importance measures since imputed values of a given variable now contain information on relationships with other variables absent from the raw data. This method is unsuitable because it precludes reliable identification of the critical determinants of PTA formation and design.

Instead of these two traditional methods, we employ on-the-fly-imputation proposed by Ishwaran et al. (2008) and Tang and Ishwaran (2017) that allows random forests to work with missing data without relying on imputation (despite its name, this technique involves no imputation when used purely for handling missing values). When constructing each tree node, the modified algorithm ignores missing values when finding the best splitting point and calculating the splitting statistic. Once the node is constructed, each missing value is (temporarily) replaced with a random draw from the distribution of non-missing values of this variable to determine which branch to send it to. The replacements are reset immediately so as not to influence further splits. This method allows us to maximize the information used (since it does not discard observations with some missing values) while not perturbing the variable importance measures (since only the non-missing values are used to create splits).

*Tuning*—The random forest algorithm has three key parameters:  $N$ , the number of trees in the forest;  $M_{try}$ , the number of predictors randomly considered as splitting candidates at each node; and  $nodesize$ , the number of observations in each cell of the tree below which the cell is not split further. Higher  $N$  is always better but more computationally costly. We set  $N = 500$  as raising it to 1,000 yields only a negligible improvement in predictive performance. We tune  $M_{try}$  and  $nodesize$  using  $k$ -fold tuning on a 2-dimensional parameter grid.<sup>5</sup> At each grid point, the data is split into

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<sup>5</sup> See Bischl et al. (2021) for an overview of this and other tuning methods.

$k$  sub-samples, or folds. We use  $k = 3$ . Consequently, three random forests are estimated: each uses two of the folds as training data and one fold as testing data. The computed prediction error is thus out-of-sample for each of the forests. The prediction error is averaged across the three random forests. The parameter grid point with the lowest prediction error is picked. We conduct the tuning procedure for each provision separately.<sup>6</sup>

The final choice is the splitting statistic the algorithm seeks to optimize when searching for the best split at each tree node. The conventional default is Gini impurity, which can be interpreted as the probability that a random PTA is classified wrongly (has the provision in question but was sent down the “0” branch, or vice versa) at the split (Biau and Scornet 2016). However, because the data we work with is highly imbalanced (for most provisions, the share of PTAs that don’t have the provision far exceeds the share that do), we find that area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC-ROC) produces considerably better predictive performance of the whole forest for almost all provisions (Ling, Huang, and Zhang 2003). The reason is that AUC-ROC can be interpreted as the probability that a random PTA that does have the provision and a random PTA that does not have a provision are both classified correctly: by equally weighting the true positives and true negatives, AUC-ROC works better with imbalanced data, even when the final performance of the whole forest is measured with the unweighted misclassification rate (which maps to Gini).

### 3.2 Variable Importance Measures

Constructing the random forest models and assessing their performance in predicting PTA formation and design is a preparatory intermediate step in our analysis. What is more central is identifying the country-level and country-pair-level characteristics that contribute the most to this performance. These characteristics can be interpreted as essential determinants of PTA formation and design. Random forests are largely appealing for our purposes because of the well-developed literature on variable importance measures (VIMs). These measures rank the predictor variables

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<sup>6</sup> Tuning the parameters provides only a small improvement in predictive performance relative to the conventional defaults of  $M_{try} = \sqrt{M}$ , where  $M$  is the total number of predictor variables, and  $nodesize = 1$ .

by their contribution to the predictive performance of the forest.

*Mean Decrease Accuracy*—Mean Decrease Accuracy (MDA) is one commonly used measure proposed in the original Breiman (2001) paper.<sup>7</sup> For a given predictor  $X$ , it randomly reshuffles the vector of values of  $X$  associated with each observation. For each tree, it then computes the prediction error obtained by running this fake data (with all variables but  $X$  retaining their true order) down the tree. It obtains the difference between this fake error (using the permuted  $X$ ) and the original prediction error (without  $X$  being permuted). The average difference across all trees is the Mean Decrease Accuracy of variable  $X$ . We use the out-of-bag misclassification rate as the conventional measure of prediction error used by the algorithm. For each observation, only the trees that did not happen to have the observation in their bootstrap training sample (i.e., the observation is “out-of-bag” for them) participate in generating the random forest’s prediction, exploiting the fact that each bootstrap sample leaves out  $\frac{1}{e} \approx 36.8\%$  of observations on average. This approach is less prone to overfitting than using the unadjusted misclassification rate. MDA is commonly used for random forests and other applications, but it has two limitations of particular concern to us. Firstly, it is mechanically biased in favor of predictors that offer many potential splitting points (Strobl et al. 2007).<sup>8</sup> Continuous variables or categorical variables with many categories receive a higher value regardless of how informative they are of the outcome variable. Secondly, MDA allows one to rank variables by their importance but provides no natural cutoffs for splitting variables into “important” and “unimportant” ones.

*Permutation Importance*—Altmann et al. (2010) developed Permutation Importance, a method of computing p-values for any VIM while simultaneously removing its biases. The core idea is an application of randomization-based inference: the method permutes the outcome variable vector (randomly reshuffling the mapping between observations and outcome variable values) many times, re-estimating the random forest and the VIM of each variable on every permutation. The distribution of  $X$ ’s MDA values across these permuted random forests composes the null distribution of the variable importance measure. The position of  $X$ ’s MDA value from the original non-

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<sup>7</sup> Mean Decrease Accuracy is sometimes called Permutation Importance. We elect the former name to avoid confusion with the method developed by Altmann et al. (2010), also called Permutation Importance, which we describe below.

<sup>8</sup> Mean Decrease Impurity, another commonly used VIM, is even more susceptible to this bias.

permuted random forest in this null distribution allows us to compute its p-value directly. This p-value constitutes the corrected variable importance measure: it does not suffer from the biases of raw MDA while also providing an absolute metric of variable importance. One drawback of this method is its computational cost, as each random forest of interest requires constructing many random forests (we conduct 100 permutations for each provision). See Janitza, Celik, and Boulesteix (2018) and Nembrini, König, and Wright (2018) for faster heuristic methods that also remove biases and provide p-values while yielding results similar to Altmann et al. (2010). Still, we use the technique by Altmann et al. (2010) as it is more theoretically grounded than these heuristic methods. The Variable Importance Measure we use is the p-value of the Permutation Importance, which uses Mean Decrease Accuracy within each permuted iteration.

## 4 Data

### 4.1 Preferential Trade Agreements and Their Provisions

We rely on three complementary datasets cataloging and classifying PTAs. We exploit the broad coverage of the EIA dataset in our analysis of the determinants of PTA formation. We then explore the features and determinants of PTA design using the classified provisions of DESTA and DTA, relying on the former for our primary analysis due to its larger sample size.

*EIA*—The most complete database of trade agreements between country pairs is the NSF-Kellogg Institute Data Base on Economic Integration Agreements (EIA) (NSF-Kellogg Institute 2021). It indexes agreements between every country pair from 1950 to 2017. The level of integration categorizes each trade deal. We use this dataset to measure whether a PTA exists between a given country pair in a given year. EIA covers the largest number of agreements but provides no information on the provisions of each agreement, precluding analysis of variation in PTA design. The following two datasets fill this gap.

*DESTA*—Design of International Trade Agreements (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014), or DESTA, provides a manual classification of provisions included into 697 PTAs. The team behind the dataset developed a classification of 313 provisions, enumerating whether each provision is included in each PTA. The dataset is regularly updated: we use the 2022 vintage.

*DTA*—Deep Trade Agreements (Mattoo, Rocha, and Ruta 2020), or DTA, provides a more fine-grained look at the contents of agreements, classifying PTA clauses into 937 provisions. The cost of this level of detail is a smaller sample size of classified PTAs, which is 274. This smaller number of agreements is why we rely on DTA for robustness checks rather than the primary analysis.

## 4.2 Potential Determinants

We assemble an extensive array of observable characteristics of countries and country pairs. The random forest algorithm will search among these factors for essential determinants of PTA formation and differences in PTA design. The inclusion of many potential determinants is motivated by existing studies on the importance of those variables for PTA formation. Our empirical strategy allows us to verify their importance for PTA formation in the presence of many other potential factors and to study their ability to explain individual provisions in signed PTAs. Other potential determinants are motivated by the growing number of provisions discussing a particular topic. For example, the rise of intellectual property rights protection clauses leads us to include several measures of countries' innovation activity, human capital, and property rights protection, as well as the differentials in these measures between the two PTA signatories. Below, we summarize the main groups of potential determinants, the motivation for including them, and the data sources that provide them.

*Economy*—Early studies like Baier and Bergstrand (2004) showed that simple economic variables like GDP level and similarity can explain much of PTA formation. To explain PTA design, however, we need to include more detailed measures. PTA provisions are often sector-specific, so our analysis includes sectoral agriculture, manufacturing, and services shares. More and more provisions protect labor rights, intellectual property, and the environment. So, we include measures of labor share in compensation, inequality, innovation, human capital, emissions, energy use and sources, and natural resource endowments. Most of these aggregate and sectoral measures are available from *Penn World Tables* (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015) and *World Development Indicators* (The World Bank 2023b).

*Proximity*—The proximity of two countries to each other is one of the most significant predictors of PTA formation (Baier and Bergstrand 2004; Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch 2016), so we include



measures of physical proximity and shipping connectivity. Many provisions attempt to harmonize institutions between two countries, motivating us to include measures of linguistic and institutional similarity and shared colonial past: these may influence how much regulatory harmonization is needed. These measures of geographic, institutional, and cultural proximity are available from *CEPII Gravity* (Conte, Cotterlaz, and Mayer 2022), *CEPII Language* (Melitz and Toubal 2014), *GeoDist* (Mayer and Zignago 2011), *UNCTADstat* (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2023).

*Trade*—We include measures of existing trade flows, tariff levels, and trade openness, as the extent of existing trade and remaining tariff trade barriers may influence whether a PTA focuses on tariffs or non-tariff regulation. We include unilateral and bilateral trade imbalance, as some studies find a prominent role of signs and magnitudes of trade imbalances in explaining PTA formation and features (Grossman and Helpman 1995; Kucik 2012; Facchini, Silva, and Willmann 2021). A growing literature shifts attention to the role of multinational corporations and global value chains in leading the push for greater trade integration (Chase 2008; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig 2018; Manger 2009; Bütthe and Milner 2008; Gamso and Grosse 2021; Manger 2015; Raimondi et al. 2023), leading us to include measures of foreign direct investment flows and intra-industry trade. These measures are constructed from data available from *UN Comtrade* (United Nations 2023), *WITS* (The World Bank 2023a), *BACI* (Gaulier and Zignago 2010), *CEPII Gravity* (Conte, Cotterlaz, and Mayer 2022), *IMF CDIS* (International Monetary Fund 2023).

*Contagion*—A large literature has documented contagion and interdependence of agreements, likely due to exporter lobbying, as an important determinant of PTA formation (Baldwin 1993; Baldwin and Jaimovich 2012; Baccini and Dür 2012; Egger and Larch 2008; Chen and Joshi 2010). If country  $j$  is an important export destination for countries  $i$  and  $k$ , and country  $k$  signs a PTA with country  $j$ , then country  $i$  has the incentive to emulate its “competitor” and also sign an agreement with country  $j$ , or else risk losing competitiveness in this export market. To capture this channel, we include a measure of contagion following this literature, primarily Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012). For country  $i$  considering an agreement with country  $j$  in time  $t$ , the contagion index of PTA property  $p$  is the number of agreements with this property that  $j$  has with other nations  $k$ , weighted by the importance of imports from  $k$  for  $j$  and by the importance of  $j$  as an export market for  $i$ :

$$\text{Contagion}_{p,ij,t} = \left( \frac{\text{bilateral exports}_{ij,t}}{\text{total exports}_{i,t}} \right) \sum_{k \neq i,j,t} \left( \frac{\text{bilateral exports}_{kj,t}}{\text{total imports}_{j,t}} \right) \mathbb{1}_{p,jk,t} \quad (1)$$

where  $\mathbb{1}_{p,jk,t}$  is an indicator function encoding the presence of PTA property  $p$  between countries  $j$  and  $k$  in year  $t$ . To represent the mechanism of PTA contagion studied in the formation literature, we construct the Contagion index using  $p = \text{existence of a PTA}$ . Our data, however, also allows us to extend this analysis to the question of interdependence of provisions. If countries  $j$  and  $k$  include a particular provision in their agreement, protecting its market share may require  $i$  not only to sign an agreement of its own with  $j$  but also to include similar provisions. Therefore, when estimating a random forest on the determinants of PTA formation or a particular provision, we include the contagion index for the property in question. When using the contagion index as a predictor of the presence of provision  $p$  in the PTA between  $i$  and  $j$  signed in year  $t$ , we lag the index by one year to avoid its contamination by countries  $k$  that are joining the same treaty (which is possible for PTAs with  $> 2$  members).

*Politics*—Many studies emphasize the *political* aspect in the political economy of PTA formation and design. Domestic political pressures (or lack thereof) and leanings appear to play a large role in the formation of PTAs (Mansfield and Milner 2012; Baccini and Urpelainen 2014; Raess, Dür, and Sari 2018). So, we test the role they may also play in PTA design by including a broad range of measures of domestic political regime and political competitiveness. An increasing number of PTA provisions focus on harmonizing domestic regulations relating to property rights, government procurement, etc. (Gamso and Grosse 2021; Lechner 2016). So, we include measures of the quality of governance in these fields. These variables are compiled from the *Database of Political Institutions* (Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2021), *Worldwide Governance Indicators* (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010), and *World Development Indicators* (The World Bank 2023b).

*Country-Pair Measures*—Some of the measures discussed above (like bilateral trade or FDI flows) are inherently measured at the country-pair level. Most potential determinants, however, are measured at the country level and need to be aggregated to the country-pair level before they can be used as explanatory variables in country-pair-level PTA formation and design analysis. Generally, we construct two aggregated variables from each country-level measure: an average of the two countries' values (either in levels or in logs, depending on context) and a difference (in levels or

in logs). This simple construction lets us capture a broad scope of mechanisms previously discussed in the literature. A clear example is the diversity of results on the effects of GDP levels and differences. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) find that country-pairs whose GDPs are bigger (high average) or more similar (low difference) are more likely to form PTAs. At the same time, Baccini and Urpelainen (2014) show that domestic political pressures may lead developing countries' governments to sign PTAs with partners much richer than themselves (high difference). Orefice and Rocha (2014) find that PTAs are deeper when members trade more intermediate inputs, especially if the PTA is across development levels (high difference). Our specification allows us to flexibly capture such effects and interactions—not only for GDP but for all variables we collect—and to explore their role in influencing PTA formation and the specifics of PTA design.

Appendix Table A.1 shows the complete list of assembled potential determinants. We have 17,678 country-pair-year observations for the primary analysis of each random forest. Each observation captures a particular PTA signed by a country-pair in a year.<sup>9</sup> Of the 313 classified DESTA provisions, a sizeable portion has either no variation across agreements (all agreements have the provision or vice versa) or minimal variation. In such cases, random forest output is hardly interpretable as the model has too little variation to train on. Therefore, we discard provisions present in less than 10% or more than 90% of country-pair-year observations, leaving 119 provisions for the analysis.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Determinants of PTA Formation

Before tackling the complexity of PTA design, we apply the random forest algorithm to identify the critical determinants of PTA formation. In this case, the algorithm's objective is to predict whether a given country-pair shares a PTA in a given year. Because most potential determinants we collected

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<sup>9</sup> Following the literature, we treat multilateral PTAs as sets of bilateral agreements between pairs of their members. This approach fits all PTA information into a rectangular table, facilitating empirical analysis and mapping results to earlier studies. At the same time, essential lessons will likely be learned from treating multilateral PTAs as singular entities, preserving the high-dimensionality of their members' characteristics. Tackling this problem with machine learning techniques will be a fruitful avenue for future research.

vary only slowly over time, we reduce the time dimension to five-year intervals, averaging the value of each determinant within the interval and treating a country-pair as having a PTA in that interval signed at any point up to the end of the interval.

*Modifications to the Random Forest Algorithm*—Due to its country-pair-period structure, the data used for the formation analysis consists of 480,738 observations, making classical random forests infeasibly computationally costly. We introduce two simplifications to the random forest algorithm that render the problem feasible. First, the procedure of finding the optimal splitting point at each tree node is simplified. Instead of considering all possible splitting points, only ten random splitting points for each variable are considered. Ishwaran (2015) finds that this simplification tends to attain predictive performance that is no worse (and potentially better) than the default algorithm. Second, we simplify the procedure of computing the variable importance: only a random 10% subsample of the data is used to come up with MDA values on each iteration of Altmann et al. (2010)’s method. We find that the results are not sensitive to the chosen subsample size. Note that the provision-level random forests discussed in Section 5.2 are computationally simpler and do not require these two simplifications.

*Performance and Imbalanced Forests*—The regular random forest attains good performance in predicting the presence of PTAs, as Appendix Table A.2 indicates. The misclassification error is the share of observations for which the forest came up with an incorrect prediction: the given country-pair had an agreement in a given period, but the forest predicted that it did not, or vice versa. The error is computed out-of-bag (OOB): to come up with a prediction for each observation in the forest, only the trees that did not have this observation in their random bootstrap training sample are used. This approach is a compromise solution between using unadjusted misclassification (which we avoid as it would be overly optimistic due to overfitting) or splitting the data into training and testing samples and using the latter only for performance evaluation (which we avoid as it would stretch our sample size too thinly). The regular random forest misclassifies only 3% of all observations. However, the overall figure masks the vast discrepancy between the two classes in the data. The PTA formation exercise is extremely imbalanced: of the 480,738 country-pair-period observations in the final data, only 16,683 have an active PTA. The forest incorrectly classifies 89% of these observations. In such highly imbalanced data, random forests focus on achieving high pre-

dictive performance for the 96.5% majority class (country pairs without a PTA) at the expense of the 3.5% minority class (country pairs with a PTA). To overcome this performance discrepancy, we employ a quantile classifier for random forests, developed by O’Brien and Ishwaran (2019), which effectively boosts the predictions of the minority class: the modified algorithm minimizes not the overall unweighted misclassification error, but the sum of the within-class misclassification errors. The performance is presented in Table 1. This random forest achieves a lower overall performance (25.5% error) but a much better balance of performance between the two classes: 26% of the majority class and 2% of the minority class are misclassified. Because our objective is not prediction but extracting insights on the importance of various predictors, we perform our analysis on this forest.

**Table 1:** Out-of-Bag Misclassification in Imbalanced Formation Random Forest

OOB Misclassification			
Overall	0 (Absent)	1 (Present)	Share of 1s
0.255	0.263	0.020	0.035

*Note.* The table presents statistics on the predictive performance of the random forest predicting PTA formation, using the quantile classifier. The misclassification error is the share of country-pair-period observations for which the random forest incorrectly predicted the presence/absence of a PTA. It is computed out-of-bag: for each observation, only the trees that did not have this observation in their training sample are used to come up with a prediction. Columns “0 (Absent)” and “1 (Present)” show misclassification only for country-pair-period observations that had or did not have an agreement within the period, respectively.

*Significant Determinants*—Table 2 lists the country-pair characteristics whose p-value variable importance is below 0.05, ranked from most to least significant. We call these the significant determinants of PTA formation. Several distinct groups of determinants emerge within the ranking. The determinants within each group are highly related. Identifying important determinants even when some form clusters of correlated variables is another advantage of the permutation importance method we adopt (Altmann et al. 2010). Geographic characteristics like the distance between the two nations, an indicator of whether they share a continent, and the exact combination of their continents are among the variables with the highest ability to predict PTA formation. This estimate confirms the findings of earlier studies identifying the importance of geographic proximity

for PTA formation (Baier and Bergstrand 2004; Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch 2016). The random forest likewise demonstrates the importance of contagion of PTAs between trading partners: the average and difference of the contagion index between the two nations are the second and third most significant determinants (Baldwin 1993; Baldwin and Jaimovich 2012; Baccini and Dür 2012; Egger and Larch 2008; Chen and Joshi 2010).

Several metrics of the domestic political situation and regime are highly predictive of PTA formation. Features of the legislative and executive branches and the overall political system appear among the most significant determinants. These findings echo the theoretical and empirical results of Mansfield and Milner (2012) showing that the domestic political regime and the number of veto players significantly affect the propensity of a nation to enter into PTAs. Another critical determinant identified by the random forest is whether the leaders of those countries are in their final term, supporting the result of Baccini and Urpelainen (2014, 2015) on the tenure of the current leader being an essential driver of whether the leader seeks PTA membership as a way to commit to reforms. Several determinants in Table 2 speak to the average regulatory quality of the two nations: the averages of “Voice and accountability”, “Regulatory quality”, and “Ease of doing business” are all important for predicting PTA formation. Regulatory convergence is a significant goal of modern PTAs (Polanco Lazo and Sauvé 2018). However, the random forest suggests that what matters the most for PTA formation is the *average level* of regulatory quality in the two nations rather than the *differential* in regulatory qualities. Predictably, several measures of trade volume appear as well. The average overall volume of trade done by two nations, the volume of their bilateral trade, and the share of bilateral trade in their overall trade are all highly predictive of PTA formation. Moreover, the bilateral intra-industry trade index is significant, supporting the existing findings that global value chains are important contributors to PTA formation, driven primarily by multi-national corporations lobbying for increased economic integration (Baccini, Dür, and Elsig 2018; Manger 2009).

*Linear Effects of Significant Determinants*—In discussing the results of Table 2, we sought to connect the significant determinants identified by the random forest to the mechanisms that the literature has studied theoretically or using conventional econometric techniques. Note, however, that we did not discuss the signs and magnitudes of the effects that these determinants have on the likeli-

**Table 2:** Significant Determinants of PTA Formation

Determinant	P-value VIM
Population-weighted distance between most populated cities	<0.01
Contagion, mean	<0.01
Contagion, difference	<0.01
Continent, combination	<0.01
Continent, same	<0.01
Price level of consumption (PPP / exchange rate), log mean	<0.01
Pair's bilateral trade in manufacturing	<0.01
Pair's bilateral trade in agriculture	<0.01
Pair's bilateral trade	<0.01
Executive branch is rural, same	<0.01
Human capital index (PWT), mean	<0.01
Value of exports, agriculture, log mean	<0.01
Legislature is bicameral, combination	<0.01
Pair's trade share in their trade with everyone	<0.01
Average annual hours worked by persons engaged, log mean	<0.01
Pair's bilateral intra-industry trade index	<0.01
Value of imports, manufacturing, log mean	<0.01
Pair's bilateral trade in agriculture, log mean	<0.01
Voice and accountability, mean	<0.01
Executive branch elected indirectly, combination	<0.01
Value of imports, services, log mean	<0.01
Regulatory quality, mean	<0.01
Value of imports, agriculture, log mean	<0.01
Executive branch is regionalist, same	<0.01
Urban population (% of total population), mean	<0.01
Value of exports, manufacturing, log mean	<0.01
Pair's bilateral trade in services, log mean	<0.01
Political system, combination	<0.01
Pair's bilateral trade in manufacturing, log mean	<0.01
Fractionalization of legislature, mean	<0.01
Capital stock, PPP, log mean	<0.01
Ease of doing business score, mean	<0.01
Incumbent leader is serving final term, same	<0.01
Frontier technology readiness index, mean	<0.01
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), mean	0.02

*Note.* The table lists the country-pair characteristics that are significant determinants (permutation importance p-value < 0.05) of PTA formation, ranked from most to least significant. All insignificant variables are omitted.

hood of PTA formation—neither did we compare the directions of these effects to the existing findings. The reason is that the random forest is effective at predicting and identifying the variables that matter most for its predictive performance but it cannot provide a single easily interpretable coefficient to summarize the effect each variable has on the outcome. Conventional linear regression yields such coefficients by imposing linearity on the data, which the random forest does not do. To aid interpretation, we conduct an auxiliary linear exercise. Table 3 presents the results of logistic regression of PTA formation on the ten most significant determinants, as selected by the random forest in Table 2. The number of determinants we can include in this linear regression is necessarily limited due to the presence of missing values: the more variables are included, the more observations are lost to missings.

**Table 3:** Effect of Most Significant Determinants on the Likelihood of PTA Formation

	PTA exists
Population-weighted distance between most populated cities	−1.09*** (0.06)
Contagion, mean	3.73*** (0.46)
Contagion, difference	−3.46*** (0.43)
Price level of consumption (PPP / exchange rate), log mean	1.09*** (0.04)
Pair’s bilateral trade in manufacturing	139.44*** (39.76)
Pair’s bilateral trade in agriculture	7.38*** (2.11)
Pair’s bilateral trade	−144.70*** (41.15)
Executive branch is rural, same	0.82*** (0.07)
N	72,279
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.34

*Note.* The table presents results of a logistic regression of the presence/absence of a PTA in country-pair-period on the most significant determinants identified by the random forest. The specification includes the “Continent, combination” (and thus implicitly “Continent, same”) determinant: the coefficients of combinations are omitted for conciseness. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> reports Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup>. All coefficients are standardized. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

Even though the logistic regression does not allow for complex non-linearities and interactions that the random forest does, it still yields some valuable insights into the role of the most critical



determinants of PTA formation. Nations farther apart are not natural trading partners and are thus less likely to sign an agreement, echoing the result of Baier and Bergstrand (2004). Controlling for overall bilateral trade, manufacturing and agriculture trade increases the likelihood of PTA formation. A greater average contagion index, which captures the competitive pressures to liberalize, likewise increases the likelihood, supporting the findings of the contagion literature (Baldwin and Jaimovich 2012). At the same time, a large differential in contagion indices between the two nations makes PTA formation *less* likely. This finding suggests that both nations must be facing competition in each other's export market from countries that have already signed a PTA. If only country  $i$  faces pressures to defend its share in  $j$ 's market but  $j$  does not face the same in reverse,  $j$  may see no incentive to enter into an agreement with  $i$ .

## 5.2 Determinants of PTA Design

While random forests yield helpful insights into the determinants of PTA formation, it is even more fruitful to apply them to the determinants of PTA design, which is more complex and diverse. In this section, we present the result of provision-level random forests that seek to predict the inclusion of each classified DESTA provision into PTAs—and to identify the country-pair characteristics most essential for this prediction.

*Performance*—First, we evaluate the goodness of fit of the random forest constructed for each provision classified in DESTA. The “overall” column of Table 4 displays the distribution of the misclassification error across provision-level random forests. The median provision's OOB misclassification is only 16.8%, and even the 75th percentile error is less than one quarter: random forests correctly predict the presence or absence of a provision in a given agreement in most cases. At the same time, the overall error masks greater heterogeneity between the two classes in the data: zeroes (provision is absent from the agreement) and ones (provision is present in the agreement). The absence of a provision (the majority class for almost all provisions) is predicted correctly in almost all cases: the median error is just 0.5%. But the presence of a provision (the minority class for most: its median share is 21.8%) is predicted far less accurately: for the median provision, 72.6% of “ones” are misclassified. On the one hand, these figures mean that random forests extract quite a bit of information on the determinants of PTA design from the data, excelling at overall prediction and

correctly predicting the presence of provisions in a fair share of cases despite the strictness of the out-of-bag measure. On the other hand, there is plenty of variation in PTA design that the random forests cannot rationalize even when considering almost three hundred observable characteristics of the signatories of each agreement.<sup>10</sup>

**Table 4:** Out-of-Bag Misclassification in Provision-Level Random Forests

	OOB Misclassification			Share of 1s
	Overall	0 (Absent)	1 (Present)	
25th %-ile	0.131	0.000	0.484	0.150
<b>median</b>	<b>0.168</b>	<b>0.005</b>	<b>0.726</b>	<b>0.218</b>
75th %-ile	0.234	0.042	0.979	0.359


*Note.* The table presents statistics on the predictive performance of provision-level random forests. The misclassification error is the share of country-pair-year observations for which the random forest predicted the presence/absence of a provision incorrectly. It is computed out-of-bag: for each observation, only the trees that did not have this observation in their training sample are used to come up with a prediction. Columns “0 (Absent)” and “1 (Present)” show misclassification only for country-pair-year observations that had or did not have the provision in their agreement, respectively.

The quantile classifier (O’Brien and Ishwaran 2019), which we employed for the formation analysis, does improve the balance of performance in the case of provision-level analysis as well, as can be seen in Appendix Table A.3. It does so, however, at the cost of a significant drop in the overall predictive performance and, more importantly, in the forest’s ability to discriminate between essential determinants of PTA design (Appendix Figure A.5). Therefore, we rely on the conventional random forests for the headline provision-level analysis below.

*Important Determinants of Overall Design*—Several country-pair characteristics stand out as essential determinants of overall PTA design. Figure 3 displays the ten factors that are significant determinants of the largest share of classified provisions. We call a variable a significant determinant of a provision if its permutation importance p-value is below 5%. Two geographic characteristics are highly predictive of differences in PTA design. The variable encoding the combination of the trading partners’ continents is the most universally important determinant of PTA provisions, sig-

<sup>10</sup> The overall performance and distribution across classes is similar for the DTA classification of provisions, see Appendix Table A.4.

nificantly contributing to the inclusion of over 80% of provisions classified in DESTA. A measure of the distance between the two trading partners is not far behind, at half of all provisions. Geographic factors that have been shown to be important for PTA formation in prior literature (Baier and Bergstrand 2004; Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch 2016) and confirmed by random forests in Section 5.1 are essential for the content of said PTAs. The interpretation of these findings, however, is different. Not only are neighbors more prone to signing agreements (which is captured by the literature's results on PTA formation), but even conditional on agreeing to sign one, neighbors may be facing different needs when liberalizing their trade compared to two geographically remote trading partners.



**Figure 3: Top Ten Determinants of Provisions**

*Note.* The figure displays the country-pair characteristics ranked by the share of provisions each is a significant determinant of. Only the top ten determinants are displayed. For a given variable, “% of provisions” measures the share of provisions for which the p-value of its variable importance measure is below 5%.

Contagion of provisions across agreements has some of the most universal predictive power. The presence of a provision in the two trading partners's agreements with third nations that compete for the market of each of the partners matters for whether the two partners choose to include this provision in an agreement of their own. Not only the average contagion between the two countries but also the contrast in the competitive pressures they face is crucial for whether the provision makes it into their PTA. This result extends the findings of an extensive literature and our results in Section 5.1 on the importance of contagion for PTA formation (Baldwin 1993; Baldwin

and Jaimovich 2012; Baccini and Dür 2012; Egger and Larch 2008; Chen and Joshi 2010), showing that it is highly relevant for understanding differences in PTA design as well. The average consumption price level in the two countries is another crucial determinant. It speaks to the real exchange rate of the two nations: not between each other, which would be captured by the difference in price levels (which is not significantly influential), but their average real exchange rate with the rest of the world. It extends prior findings that real exchange rate movements (or fear thereof) may limit nations' desire to commit to integration (Fernández-Arias, Panizza, and Stein 2004). The human capital index (as constructed by Penn World Tables) is also highly relevant. The importance of the development level for PTA design is not surprising: what is interesting is that random forests found this development metric the most informative. At the same time, random forests do not find the *difference* in development levels (by any metric) to be particularly relevant for PTA design, in contrast to the existing literature finding it to be essential for PTA formation (Manger 2009; Bütte and Milner 2008; Baccini and Urpelainen 2014).

Average relative Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows are an important determinant of almost half of DESTA provisions. Their significance is particularly stark as FDI flows were not an essential determinant of PTA formation in Section 5.1. This result supports the literature's focus on multi-national corporations as one of the primary drivers of the increasing depth of recent agreements, shifting their focus from simple trade liberalization through tariff reduction to FDI liberalization through regulation harmonization (Manger 2009; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig 2018; Gamso and Grosse 2021; Kim et al. 2019). Another set of essential determinants relates to the average quality of governance of the two nations, as captured by World Governance Indicators' "Regulatory quality" and "Voice and accountability" metrics. Predictably, the regulatory apparatus of the trading partners matters for their ability and will to impose international regulation on each other (Polanco Lazo and Sauvé 2018). This observation extends the findings of Gamso and Grosse (2021) and Lechner (2016) on the importance of domestic regulation for PTA provisions sought in negotiations. At the same time, internal political factors—like political competitiveness, leaning of the current government, or the tenure of the current leader—have been previously shown to be essential for PTA formation (Mansfield and Milner 2012; Baccini and Urpelainen 2014) and confirmed by random forests in Section 5.1, but the random forests do not find them to be particularly

informative for PTA design.

While the analysis above used PTA provisions as classified in the DESTA dataset, random forests estimated on the DTA classification produce a similar ranking of significant determinants: see Appendix Figure A.6. Random forests estimated on DESTA using the quantile classifier show a significantly lower ability to discriminate between determinants (consistently indicating that almost all variables are important predictors of a given provision). However, a similar list of characteristics remains on top, as shown in Appendix Figure A.5.

*Important Determinants of Provisions by Policy Area*—PTA provisions cover many trade issues. What is essential for one area may be irrelevant for another. DESTA groups provisions by policy area they fit in. We repeat the exercise of identifying the most important determinants within these areas. Table 5 lists up to three most important determinants for each provision area, discarding determinants that appear in the overall ranking in Figure 3. Thus, we obtain a list of *uniquely* important determinants by policy area that are highly predictive for understanding PTA design within this area but few others.

**Table 5:** Uniquely Important Determinants of Each Provision Area

Determinant	Share of provisions
<b>Capital Movement And Exchange Rates</b>	
Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita), mean	3/7
Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita), difference	3/7
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), difference	3/7
<b>Competition</b>	
Government effectiveness, mean	4/7
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP), mean	4/7
Urban population (% of total population), mean	4/7
<b>Dispute Settlement</b>	
Ease of doing business score, mean	7/17
Government effectiveness, mean	7/17
Rule of law, mean	7/17
<b>Intellectual Property Rights</b>	
Government effectiveness, mean	2/7
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, mean	2/7
Regulatory quality, difference	2/7
<b>Investments</b>	
Government effectiveness, mean	4/16
Lax checks and balances index, mean	4/16

Share of trade in services, mean	4/16
<b>Market Access</b>	
Checks and balances index, mean	4/4
Lax checks and balances index, mean	4/4
Pair's bilateral trade in services, log mean	3/4
<b>Non-Trade Issues</b>	
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), mean	3/4
Value of imports, manufacturing, log mean	3/4
Pair's bilateral trade in manufacturing, log mean	3/4
<b>Sanitary And Phytosanitary Measures</b>	
Ease of doing business score, mean	3/4
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), difference	3/4
Share of trade in services, mean	3/4
<b>Services</b>	
Energy imports, net (% of energy use), mean	5/17
Government effectiveness, mean	5/17
Government effectiveness, difference	5/17
<b>Technical Barriers To Trade</b>	
Human capital index (WDI), mean	5/6
Statistical performance indicators, mean	5/6
TFP level, PPP, log mean	5/6
<b>Temporary Entry Of Business Persons</b>	
Continent, same	2/6
<b>Trade Defense Instruments</b>	
Urban population (% of total population), mean	11/13
Capital stock, PPP, log mean	9/13
Pair's bilateral trade in services, log mean	9/13

*Note.* The table presents determinants ranked by the number of provisions each is significant for, by provision area. The top 10 determinants by the overall number of provisions they are important for are excluded, leaving variables that are uniquely important for each area. Provision areas are presented as categorized in DESTA, dropping areas with one or no provisions in our sample. For a given variable, "Share of provisions" counts the provisions in each area for which the p-value of its variable importance measure is below 5%. Within each area, variables are ranked by this share and only the top 3 are displayed, or fewer if the area lacks unique significant determinants.

Measures of domestic administrative quality are even more relevant for some areas. Several metrics from the World Governance Indicators ("Government effectiveness", "Regulatory quality", "Rule of law"), the Database of Political Institutions ("Checks and balances") or the World Bank's Doing Business survey ("Ease of doing business", "Cost of business start-up procedures") emerge on top as predictors of provisions on *capital movement, competition, dispute settlement, intellectual property rights, investments, market access, and services*. "Statistical performance indicators", a measure of the quality of government statistics and also tightly linked to administrative effectiveness, matters for provisions on the *technical trade barriers*. While only the two partners' average in each measure

matters for the overall design, the differentials in regulatory quality between the two countries are among the top determinants of several of these policy areas. Indeed, significant differences in regulatory quality may be the main incentive for harmonizing regulations between PTA members (Polanco Lazo and Sauvé 2018). Curiously, natural resource extraction and energy import metrics are highly relevant for provisions on *competition* and *services*. One potential interpretation is that commodity exporters and countries that instead rely on energy imports seek different objectives from trade integration and thus include various provisions in their agreements.


### 5.3 Important Determinants of Provisions That Are Most Impactful for Trade

The exercises above consider all provisions classified in DESTA (conditional on each provision having sufficient variation). Not all provisions matter equally for trade outcomes, and those that do may be of particular interest to researchers and policymakers. Breinlich et al. (2021) use a version of the lasso regularized regression to identify a list of DTA provisions with the largest effects on trade outcomes. In this section, we explore the important determinants of the provisions they identified. We use the list of seven provisions the plug-in PPML-lasso regression produces as in Table 5 of Breinlich et al. (2021).<sup>11</sup> Figure 4 lists the country-pair characteristics that are important determinants of the inclusion of provisions that are impactful for trade outcomes. Only the determinants of two or more provisions are listed. Overall, factors important for overall PTA design (Section 5.2)—measures of geographic proximity, regulatory quality, and contagion—emerge as leading determinants of the inclusion of trade-relevant provisions. Average energy use, energy imports, and natural resource rents are also highly relevant for these selected provisions, analogously to the *services* and *competition* policy areas.

*Linear Effects of Determinants*—To help interpret *how* the identified significant determinants of trade-relevant provisions affect their inclusion, we conduct an auxiliary linear regression exercise akin to that done in Section 5.1 for the question of PTA formation. Column “Count” of Table 6 presents a Poisson regression of the number of trade-relevant provisions included in a PTA on the most

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<sup>11</sup> The method they use identifies eight provisions, but two are perfectly collinear, and thus we drop one. Furthermore, they also developed the iceberg lasso method. It identifies a greater number of impactful provisions, but these are highly collinear with the eight identified by the plug-in PPML-Lasso.



**Figure 4:** Top Determinants of Provisions Impactful for Trade

*Note.* The figure displays the country-pair characteristics ranked by the share of provisions each is a significant determinant of. For a given variable, “# of provisions” measures the number of provisions for which the p-value of its variable importance measure is below 5%. Seven DTA provisions identified in Table 5 of Breinlich et al. (2021) are used.

essential determinants identified in Figure 4. We restrict the regression exercise to statistically significant determinants for three or more provisions among the seven identified by Breinlich et al. (2021) to avoid losing too many observations to missing values. For a more fine-grained look, we apply a hurdle model that tends to fit count data better by splitting the problem into two: first, it uses a logistic regression to predict whether the count is above zero or not; second, it uses a Poisson regression to predict the value of the count provided it is non-zero (Lambert 1992; Mullahy 1986; Feng 2021). In our application, the first stage, in column “Any” of Table 6, captures the determinants of whether *any* trade-relevant provisions were included. The second stage, in column “Count ( $\geq 1$ )”, captures the determinants of *how many* trade-relevant provisions were included in PTAs that have at least some.

The exercise yields fewer interpretable insights than its analog in Section 5.1. “Voice and accountability” is negatively associated with the propensity of two nations to have *any* trade-relevant provisions in their agreement but positively associated with the *number* of these provisions. Greater distance reduces the expected number of trade-relevant provisions as long as there are some. Most puzzlingly, the estimated effects of the aggregates of the contagion index are indistinguishable from zero for the count specification and have unexpected signs for the “any” specification. Greater



contagion pressures shared by both nations (captured by “Contagion, mean”) appear to harm a PTA’s chances of having any trade-relevant provisions, and the differential in contagion pressures between the two nations (captured by “Contagion, difference”) appears to boost them. Both are counter to theoretical mechanisms developed in the literature on contagion cited above and our results on PTA formation in Section 5.1. These puzzling results underscore that random forests can pick up complex non-linear and interacting relationships between potential determinants and PTA design differences that are not easily summarized with a linear approximation.

**Table 6:** Effects of Most Important Determinants on the Presence and Number of PTA Provisions Most Impactful for Trade

	Count	Hurdle Model	
		Any	Count ( $\geq 1$ )
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita), log mean	−0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.12)	0.04 (0.03)
Contagion, difference	−0.01 (0.02)	9.88*** (2.28)	0.00 (0.02)
Contagion, mean	0.01 (0.02)	−14.04*** (3.28)	0.01 (0.01)
Population-weighted distance between most populated cities	−0.08 (0.06)	0.16 (0.20)	−0.08*** (0.03)
Voice and accountability, mean	0.18*** (0.04)	−1.29*** (0.18)	0.07** (0.03)
Human capital index (PWT), mean	0.04 (0.04)	−0.10 (0.21)	0.00 (0.03)
N	1,884	1,884	1,608
Pseudo $R^2$	0.91	0.39	0.91

*Note.* The table presents results of regressions of the number and presence of most impactful provisions identified by Breinlich et al. (2021) on the most important determinants identified in this section. Column “Count”: Poisson regression on the number of selected provisions in a PTA. Column “Any”: logistic regression on whether any selected provisions are present in a PTA. Column “Count ( $\geq 1$ )”: Poisson regression on the count of selected provisions, conditional on it being non-zero. All three regressions include the “Continent, combination” determinant: coefficients of its combinations are omitted for conciseness. Pseudo  $R^2$  reports Nagelkerke  $R^2$ . All columns report standardized coefficients, making magnitudes comparable within columns (but not across since different models are used). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## 6 Conclusion

Modern preferential trade agreements are increasingly complex and diverse. Existing research has studied many factors that determine PTA formation and design. At the same time, those studies consider only a limited number of determinants at once and reduce PTA design to the presence

of a specific provision or a single index of PTA depth. Machine learning techniques provide one avenue to overcome these limitations and compare many potential determinants of PTA design while preserving the high dimensionality of design differences. We apply random forests to select the country-pair characteristics with the highest predictive power over including various provisions in PTAs, thus identifying the critical determinants of PTA design. Several categories of determinants emerge as essential for most provisions. These determinants are the contagion of PTA features across trading partners, measures of geographic proximity, regulatory quality, and FDI flows. These findings point to several of the mechanisms of PTA formation or design that the literature has studied (Baldwin and Jaimovich 2012; Gamso and Grosse 2021; Mansfield and Milner 2012). At the same time, many other determinants linked to previously studied mechanisms are not identified by random forests to be particularly informative of PTA design differences, particularly those related to internal political situation and economic differences across partners (e.g. Baccini and Urpelainen 2014; Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch 2016). This difference suggests that such factors could be relevant for PTA formation but less critical for the contents that negotiators settle on.

There are several directions of future research that can build on our methodology and findings. First, adopting machine learning techniques that are less structured than random forests may allow future research to study the determinants of PTA formation and design while retaining the high dimensionality of PTA membership. Our approach represented multilateral PTAs as sets of bilateral agreements to facilitate empirical analysis with random forests, but less structured approaches may bring the size and composition of a PTA's membership into the picture. Second, future research can delve deeper into the individual mechanisms identified by random forests as important for PTA formation and design. Random forests excel at picking up all kinds of nonlinearities and interactions between variables in the data but do so at the cost of interpretability of individual mechanisms. Although they highlight the country-pair characteristics that are most relevant to PTA design, they leave it for conventional econometric methods to tease out *how* or *why* each characteristic affects the design. Thus, our results motivate further research focusing on individual mechanisms that relate to essential determinants identified by the random forests.

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
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
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## Appendix Figures and Tables




**Figure A.1:** Number of Country Pairs with an Active Agreement

*Note.* The figure displays the percentage share of all country pairs that were members of the same PTA (as classified in EIA) in a given year.




**Figure A.2:** Number of PTAs Signed per Year (Data: DTA)

*Note.* The figure is the analog of Figure 1b, using PTAs as classified in DTA rather than DESTA. The figure displays the number of new PTAs signed per year.




**Figure A.3:** Average Number of Provisions in a PTA over Time (Data: DTA)

*Note.* The figure is the analog of Figure 1c, using PTAs and provisions as classified in DTA rather than DESTA. The figure displays the average number of provisions in newly signed PTAs, by year.




**Figure A.4:** Variance of Provisions Included in PTAs over Time (Data: DTA)

*Note.* The figure is the analog of Figure 1d, using PTAs and provisions as classified in DTA rather than DESTA. Variance is measured as the trace of the covariance matrix of vectors indicating the inclusion of provisions in each PTA, which is equivalent to the sum of variances of the binary provision inclusion variable across provisions.



**Figure A.5:** Top Determinants of Provisions, Imbalanced Random Forests

*Note.* The figure displays the country-pair characteristics ranked by the share of provisions each is a significant determinant of, using the imbalanced classifier random forests. For a given variable, “% of provisions” measures the share of provisions for which the p-value of its variable importance measure is below 5%.



**Figure A.6:** Top Ten Determinants of Provisions, DTA

*Note.* The figure displays the country-pair characteristics ranked by the share of provisions each is a significant determinant of, using the DTA classification. For a given variable, “% of provisions” measures the share of provisions for which the p-value of its variable importance measure is below 5%.

**Table A.1:** List of Potential Determinants Used in Random Forests, Grouped by Data Source

Variable	Aggregators
<b>CEPII BACI + UN Comtrade</b>	
Pair's bilateral intra-industry trade index	
Pair's bilateral trade	
Pair's bilateral trade in agriculture	
Pair's bilateral trade in manufacturing	
Pair's bilateral trade in services	
Share of bilateral trade in agriculture	
Share of bilateral trade in manufacturing	
Share of bilateral trade in services	
Share of trade in agriculture	mean, difference
Share of trade in manufacturing	mean, difference
Share of trade in services	mean, difference
Total trade	log mean, log diff.
Value of exports, agriculture	log mean, log diff.
Value of exports, manufacturing	log mean, log diff.
Value of imports, agriculture	log mean, log diff.
Value of imports, manufacturing	log mean, log diff.
Value of imports, services	log mean, log diff.
<b>CEPII Geodist</b>	
Continent	same, combination
Landlocked	same, combination
<b>CEPII Gravity</b>	
EU member	same
GATT member	same
WTO member	same
Historical origin of the legal system	same
Pair ever in a colonial dependency relationship	
Pair ever in a colonial sibling relationship	
Pair is contiguous	
Pair shares common language spoken by 9%+ of population	
Pair shares common legal system origins	
Pair shares common official/primary language	
Pair's trade share imbalance	
Pair's trade share in their trade with everyone	
Population-weighted distance between most populated cities	
Religious proximity index	
Trade imbalance, relative	
<b>CEPII Language</b>	
Pair's linguistic proximity (LP1)	
Pair's linguistic proximity (LP2)	
<b>Composite</b>	
Contagion	mean, difference
<b>Database of Political Institutions</b>	



Checks and balances index	mean, difference
Executive branch elected indirectly	same, combination
Executive branch is nationalist	same, combination
Executive branch is religious	same, combination
Executive branch is rural	same, combination
Executive branch is regionalist	same, combination
Fractionalization of legislature	mean, difference
Fractionalization of opposition	mean, difference
Fractionalization of the executive	mean, difference
Ideological position of the executive branch	same, combination
Incumbent leader is serving final term	same, combination
Incumbent leader still in office	same, combination
Largest party in the executive is right-leaning	same, combination
Lax checks and balances index	mean, difference
Legislature has multiple parties	same, combination
Legislature is bicameral	same, combination
Military has a role in government	same, combination
Number of years the incumbent leader's been in office	mean, difference
Political system	same, combination
<b>IMF CDIS</b>	
FDI imbalance	mean, difference
FDI inflow	log mean, log diff.
FDI outflow	log mean, log diff.
Pair's FDI share imbalance	
Pair's FDI share in their FDI with everyone	
Pair's relative FDI imbalance	
Total FDI	log mean, log diff.
<b>Penn World Table</b>	
TFP level, PPP	log mean, log diff.
Average annual hours worked by persons engaged	log mean, log diff.
Capital services levels, PPP	log mean, log diff.
Capital stock depreciation rate	mean, difference
Capital stock, PPP	log mean, log diff.
Government consumption share in GDP, PPP	mean, difference
Gross capital formation share in GDP, PPP	mean, difference
Household consumption share in GDP, PPP	mean, difference
Human capital index (PWT)	mean, difference
Number of persons engaged	log mean, log diff.
Population	log mean, log diff.
Price level of consumption (PPP / exchange rate)	log mean, log diff.
Real GDP, PPP	log mean, log diff.
Real consumption, PPP	log mean, log diff.
Real domestic absorption, PPP	log mean, log diff.
Real internal rate of return	mean, difference
Share of labor compensation in GDP	mean, difference
<b>UNCTAD</b>	
Container port throughput	log mean, log diff.

Frontier technology readiness index	mean, difference
Pair's liner connectivity index	
<b>WITS</b>	
Avg weighted tariff pair levies on each other	
Difference in weighted tariff pair levies on each other	
<b>World Development Indicators</b>	
CPIA building human resources rating	mean, difference
CPIA business regulatory environment rating	mean, difference
CPIA debt policy rating	mean, difference
CPIA economic management cluster average	mean, difference
CPIA efficiency of revenue mobilization rating	mean, difference
CPIA equity of public resource use rating	mean, difference
CPIA financial sector rating	mean, difference
CPIA fiscal policy rating	mean, difference
CPIA gender equality rating	mean, difference
CPIA macroeconomic management rating	mean, difference
CPIA policies for social inclusion/equity cluster average	mean, difference
CPIA policy and institutions for environmental sustainability	mean, difference
CPIA property rights and rule-based governance rating	mean, difference
CPIA public sector management and institutions cluster average	mean, difference
CPIA quality of budgetary and financial management rating	mean, difference
CPIA quality of public administration rating	mean, difference
CPIA social protection rating	mean, difference
CPIA structural policies cluster average	mean, difference
CPIA trade rating	mean, difference
CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating	mean, difference
Agricultural land (% of land area)	mean, difference
Arable land (% of land area)	mean, difference
Average time to clear exports through customs	mean, difference
Bribery incidence	mean, difference
Business extent of disclosure index	mean, difference
Central government debt, total (% of GDP)	mean, difference
Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita)	mean, difference
Current account balance (% of GDP)	mean, difference
Depth of credit information index	mean, difference
Ease of doing business score	mean, difference
Educational attainment: % of population 25+ completed upper secondary	mean, difference
Educational attainment: % of population 25+ with Bachelor's	mean, difference
Energy imports, net (% of energy use)	mean, difference
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)	log mean, log diff.
Firms formally registered when operations started (% of firms)	mean, difference
Firms that spend on R&D (% of firms)	mean, difference
Firms using banks to finance working capital (% of firms)	mean, difference
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	mean, difference
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)	mean, difference
Human capital index (WDI)	mean, difference
Industrial design applications, resident, by count	log mean, log diff.

Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	mean, difference
International migrant stock (% of population)	mean, difference
Labor force	log mean, log diff.
Labor force participation rate	mean, difference
Land area	log mean, log diff.
Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (% of GDP)	mean, difference
Net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	mean, difference
Net migration	mean, difference
Patent applications, residents	log mean, log diff.
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)	mean, difference
Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)	mean, difference
Rural land area	log mean, log diff.
Statistical capacity score	mean, difference
Statistical performance indicators	mean, difference
Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP)	mean, difference
Strength of legal rights index	mean, difference
Total greenhouse gas emissions (kt of CO2 equivalent)	log mean, log diff.
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)	mean, difference
Trademark applications, resident, by count	log mean, log diff.
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)	mean, difference
Urban land area	log mean, log diff.
Urban population (% of total population)	mean, difference
<b>World Governance Indicators</b>	
Control of corruption	mean, difference
Government effectiveness	mean, difference
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism	mean, difference
Regulatory quality	mean, difference
Rule of law	mean, difference
Voice and accountability	mean, difference

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*Note.* Variables are grouped by the source the measure was taken from or whose data it's constructed from. The "aggregators" column lists ways in which country-year variables were aggregated between the two countries to form country-pair-year variables. Options are: mean (in levels or in logs) and difference (level or log) for numeric variables, same (a binary indicator for whether the two countries' values match) and combination (a category for each possible combination of values) for categorical variables. Bilateral variables measured at the country-pair-level originally do not require such aggregation, and so "aggregators" blank for them.

**Table A.2:** Out-of-Bag Misclassification in Regular Formation Random Forest

OOB Misclassification			
Overall	0 (Absent)	1 (Present)	Share of 1s
0.031	0.000	0.887	0.035

*Note.* The table presents statistics on the predictive performance of the random forest predicting PTA formation. The misclassification error is the share of country-pair-period observations for which the random forest predicted the presence/absence of a PTA incorrectly. It is computed out-of-bag: for each observation, only the trees that did not have this observation in their training sample are used to come up with a prediction. Columns “0 (Absent)” and “1 (Present)” show misclassification only for country-pair-period observations that had or did not have an agreement within the period, respectively.

**Table A.3:** Out-of-Bag Misclassification in Provision-Level Imbalanced Random Forests

	OOB Misclassification			Share of 1s
	Overall	0 (Absent)	1 (Present)	
25th %-ile	0.210	0.226	0.057	0.164
<b>median</b>	<b>0.281</b>	<b>0.290</b>	<b>0.114</b>	<b>0.231</b>
75th %-ile	0.336	0.371	0.183	0.403

*Note.* The table presents statistics on the predictive performance of provision-level random forests, using the quantile classifier. The misclassification error is the share of country-pair-year observations for which the random forest predicted the presence/absence of a provision incorrectly. It is computed out-of-bag: for each observation, only the trees that did not have this observation in their training sample are used to come up with a prediction. Columns “0 (Absent)” and “1 (Present)” show misclassification only for country-pair-year observations that had or did not have the provision in their agreement, respectively.

**Table A.4:** Out-of-Bag Misclassification in Provision-Level Random Forests, DTA

	OOB Misclassification			Share of 1s
	Overall	0 (Absent)	1 (Present)	
25th %-ile	0.117	0.000	0.284	0.151
<b>median</b>	<b>0.153</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.798</b>	<b>0.212</b>
75th %-ile	0.195	0.039	0.953	0.380

*Note.* The table presents statistics on the predictive performance of provision-level random forests, using DTA classification. The misclassification error is the share of country-pair-year observations for which the random forest predicted the presence/absence of a provision incorrectly. It is computed out-of-bag: for each observation, only the trees that did not have this observation in their training sample are used to come up with a prediction. Columns “0 (Absent)” and “1 (Present)” show misclassification only for country-pair-year observations that had or did not have the provision in their agreement, respectively.